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While the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance has been widely researched, the
empirical evidence has provided mixed results. China’s economy has been developing quickly since itsction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
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76 M. Yu /China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 75–87economic reform in the early 1980s, which makes research in this market intriguing. Because the Chinese gov-
ernment privatized small- and medium-sized state owned enterprises (SOEs) and corporatized large SOEs dur-
ing the reforms, many Chinese public listed companies (PLCs) have a high level of state ownership. China
initiated the Split Share Structure Reform during 2005–2006 and state shareholdings have since decreased.
Chinese companies normally have a concentrated ownership structure, limited disclosure, poor investor pro-
tection, and reliance on the banking system. This paper attempts to answer the following questions. Is state
ownership related to ﬁrm performance for Chinese PLCs? How has Chinese PLC state ownership changed
since the Split Share Structure Reform? Did the Split Share Structure Reform play a positive role in moder-
ating the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance?
This study examines the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance for Chinese PLCs.
Panel data regression techniques are used to examine the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm per-
formance for 10,639 ﬁrm-year observations of non-ﬁnancial Chinese PLCs during 2003–2010. The results
show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with ﬁrm performance. The Split Share Structure
Reform in 2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm
proﬁtability ratios. Although state ownership decreased signiﬁcantly after 2006, it remains high in strategically
important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the publishing, broadcasting and
media sector. The ﬁndings reveal that a higher level of state ownership is superior to a dispersed ownership
structure due to the beneﬁts of government support and political connections. The Split Share Structure
Reform made previously non-tradable shares legally tradable, improving corporate governance and reducing
the negative eﬀect of non-tradable state shares.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the literature in this area, the rel-
evant theoretical frameworks, and empirical evidence. Sections 3 and 4 describe the model design and deﬁne
the variables. In Section 5, panel data regressions are used to examine the relationship and the regression
results are reported. Finally, conclusions and policy implications are oﬀered in Section 6.
2. Literature review
Modern corporations face the issue of separation of ownership and control. It is desirable to monitor man-
agement to ensure it acts in shareholders’ interests. While the biggest shareholder and block shareholders have
the resources and incentives to supervise the work of management, a dispersed shareholding structure suﬀers
from the “free-rider” problem. In general, the corporate governance literature has identiﬁed block ownership
as an inﬂuential mechanism that mitigates the agency problem between managers and shareholders (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997; Claessens and Djankov, 1999). Large shareholders provide at least a partial solution to the
free-rider problem of small investors, but blockholder ownership above a certain level may lead to the
entrenchment of owner–managers that expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Morck et al., 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The belief in public ownership ineﬃciency is underlined by the property rights perspective in economics
(Martin and Parker, 1997; Villalonga, 2000) and the residual claimant theory (Rowthorn and Chang,
1993). The property rights theory claims that such rights in the private sector are more clearly deﬁned than
in the public sector, and thus, the incentive for seeking proﬁts by private owners leads to more eﬀective mon-
itoring of management performance (Alchian, 1965; McCormick and Meiners, 1988).
In the US and UK, although ownership structures are dispersed, minority shareholders’ rights are protected
by a well-developed legal infrastructure, managerial labor market, and active takeover markets. A review of
the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia by Claessens and Fan (2002) conﬁrms the limited pro-
tection of minority shareholders’ rights in Asia and the agency problems exacerbated by the low corporate
transparency associated with rent-seeking and relationship-based transactions, extensive group structures,
and risky ﬁnancial structures. Chinese companies normally have a concentrated ownership structure, limited
disclosure, poor investor protection, and reliance on the banking system. Law enforcement is quite weak. The
large block shareholders for Chinese PLCs include private, state, or institutional shareholders. Because the
Chinese government privatized small- and medium-sized SOEs and corporatized large SOEs during China’s
economic reforms, many Chinese public listed companies have high levels of state ownership. As the state
is a major block shareholder of Chinese PLCs, this study identiﬁes the role played by state ownership in ﬁrm
M. Yu /China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 75–87 77performance. It explores whether state ownership hinders or improves ﬁrm performance for Chinese PLCs in
the new millennium.
The subject of state ownership has inspired many empirical studies. However, the empirical evidence for the
relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance has been mixed. Table 1 summarizes a few key
studies and their ﬁndings. Qi et al. (2000) examine a sample of Shanghai Stock Exchange-listed Chinese ﬁrms
from 1991 to 1996 and conclude that state equity ownership is negatively related to operating performance.
Further, Sun et al. (2002) examine a sample of Chinese listed ﬁrms from 1994 to 1997 and conclude that state
equity ownership has an inverted U-shaped or concave relationship with market performance. They reason
that government political support and business connections provided through state ownership are valuable
and necessary to vitalize performance. However, Ng et al. (2009) and Hess et al. (2010), who examine Chinese
listed ﬁrms from 1996 to 2003 and 2000 to 2004, respectively, both ﬁnd a convex relationship between state
ownership and market performance. This is inconsistent with the relationship found by Sun et al. (2002).
Therefore, the relationship between state ownership and Chinese ﬁrm performance is unresolved.
The mixed empirical results may be attributable to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, ﬁrm performance mea-
surements, and sample selection techniques. While Jiang et al. (2008) apply OLS regressions to cross-sectional
data from 2004, Hess et al. (2010) use two-stage least squares analysis on balanced panel data. Hovey et al.
(2003) randomly select 97 Chinese PLCs, while Wei et al. (2005) include all non-ﬁnancial PLCs. Most studies
have used ﬁnancial ratios or market-based indicators to measure ﬁrm performance. Wei and Varela (2003)
also use share returns and Lin et al. (2009) use ﬁrm eﬃciency. The implications of state ownership on ﬁrm
performance may vary, as the performance indicators measure diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrm performance. Sun
et al. (2002) and Wei (2007) use the market to book ratio (MBR) as a market-based indicator. Both studies
ﬁnd a concave relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance. Some researchers have used
Tobin’s Q to reveal a convex relationship (e.g., Wei and Varela, 2003; Ng et al., 2009; Hess et al., 2010). Chi-
na’s stock prices have been extremely volatile and contain a large noise component (Xu and Wang, 1999).
Measures that incorporate share price information such as share returns, the MBR or Tobin’s Q are problem-
atic in China (Jiang et al., 2008). It is an issue of the construct validity of the market-based indicators in China.
As it is less noisy, the Tobin’s Q measurement is better than the MBR.
Chinese PLCs experienced a great institutional change in the new century, and it is therefore imperative to
conduct empirical tests on PLCs in relation to that change. In 2005–2006, Chinese authorities launched the
Split Share Structure Reform program on the country’s capital markets, aiming to eliminate non-tradable
shares. China opened the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange markets in 1990 and 1991, respectively,
and began to develop its capital markets. A peculiarity of the Chinese markets is that only about one third
of the shares in listed companies are legally tradable. When the Chinese government reformed SOEs to share-
holding companies, various share ownership types were created, such as state shares, legal person shares, and
A-shares. Unlike A-shares, state and legal person shares are not legally tradable and are usually government
owned. They typically belong to the State or to domestic institutions ultimately owned by central or local gov-
ernments. A split share structure was created because while these two classes of shares had diﬀerent prices,
they shared the same voting, cash ﬂow, and other legal rights. The non-tradable shares can be transferred
through negotiation or auction, but not in the open markets.
Non-tradable shares have long been considered a major hurdle to domestic ﬁnancial market development
(Beltratti et al., 2012). The existence of state and legal person shares has created a few problems. Because they
are mostly government owned, the standard principal-agent problem is compounded by a multiple-principal
problem, as government owners may pursue diﬀerent objectives that do not necessarily relate to proﬁt max-
imization. Because the majority of total shares comprise state and legal person shares, which are non-tradable,
an outside market under corporate control was precluded (Jiang et al., 2008). The major shareholders were
relatively indiﬀerent to stock price movements, and the limited free ﬂoat made the domestic market extremely
illiquid and volatile (Beltratti et al., 2012).
Such problems triggered the share reform. At the beginning of 2005, about two thirds of the Chinese stock
market comprised non-tradable shares. In April 2005, the Chinese government announced the Split Share
Structure Reform, aiming to eliminate non-tradable shares by the end of 2006. The reform obliged the holders
of non-tradable shares to compensate the holders of tradable shares in exchange for the right to sell their
shares, typically in the forms of bonus shares, cash compensations, and options. To facilitate the reform, a
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M. Yu /China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 75–87 79series of measures were taken to address the issue of price volatility and stabilize the stock market. The lockup
period was at least 1 year for holders of non-tradable shares after they obtain the liquidity right to convert
their shares into tradable shares. Furthermore, in the 2 years after the expiration of the lockup, a holder of
non-tradable shares cannot trade more than 5% (10%) of the company’s total share capital within 1 year
(2 years). By mid-2006, this conversion process had been completed by 94% of listed companies (People’s
Daily, 2006). It increased the tradable share proportion and signaled the beginning of the decline in govern-
ment-owned shares. The short-term investor response has been extremely positive amid expectations of
improved corporate governance and a greater focus on proﬁt maximization (Jiang et al., 2008).
The key purpose of this study is to examine the eﬀects of state ownership on ﬁrm performance using a larger
and more recent sample of 10,639 ﬁrm-year observations of Chinese public listed ﬁrms during 2003–2010. This
study contributes to the literature by examining the eﬀect of the Split Share Structure Reform on the relation-
ship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance and by providing the most recent empirical evidence for
Chinese public listed companies.
3. Model design
We use panel data regressions to test the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance. Panel
data include repeated measures of one or more variables on one or more ﬁrms (repeated cross-sectional time
series). It is more informative (more variability, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom), and the estimates
are more eﬃcient. Panel data also allow for control of individual unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge,
2003).
The econometric model is speciﬁed as follows:Perf it ¼ bX it þ ai þ ct þ eit ð1Þ
Here, Perfit represents dependent variables to measure ﬁrm performance for ﬁrm i at time t, including return
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q. Xit is a vector of variables including board and ﬁrm
characteristics such as state ownership, director ownership, director compensation, debt ratio, and ﬁrm size.
These variables have been commonly used in corporate governance literature. b represents the coeﬃcients to
be estimated, and eit is the error term. ai is the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect, and ct is the year ﬁxed eﬀect.
We use panel data analysis techniques to analyze the implications of state ownership on ﬁrm performance.
In examining the repeated cross-section of observations, panel data are better suited to study the dynamics of
change (Gujarati, 2003). The panel data include ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) and random eﬀects (RE) estimators. If the
regressors are correlated with individual unobserved eﬀects (ai), the FE estimator is consistent, but the RE
estimator is not consistent. If the regressors are uncorrelated with ai, the FE estimator is still consistent albeit
ineﬃcient, and the RE estimator is consistent and eﬃcient (Baum, 2006). Therefore, we may consider these
two alternatives in the Hausman test framework, ﬁtting both models, and comparing their common coeﬃcient
estimates. In this paper, FE and RE are compared using the Hausman test and the results are reported.
4. Variable deﬁnitions
Financial performance refers to a company’s ability to generate new resources from day-to-day operations
over a given timeframe. A company’s performance is gauged by its net income and cash from operations. This
study uses ROA and ROE to measure proﬁtability. ROA is calculated by dividing total proﬁts plus ﬁnancial
expenses by average total assets. Average total assets are the average of beginning total assets plus ending total
assets. ROE is obtained by dividing net proﬁts by average shareholders’ equity. Average shareholders’ equity
is the average of ending shareholders’ equity from last year plus ending shareholders’ equity in the present
year. Tobin’s Q is deﬁned as the ratio of market value to ending total assets, where market value is the
sum of the market value of equity and the market value of net debt. Net assets are used to calculate the market
value of non-negotiable equity.
State ownership is the percentage of state ownership. Director compensation is measured as the total emol-
ument of the top three directors. The yearly emolument of the top three highest board members are disclosed
in Chinese listed companies’ annual reports. Board ownership is measured as total directors’ ownership
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holder and management interests. Total liabilities divided by total assets is used to measure the debt ratio.
Firm size is measured by the book value of ﬁrm assets.
Previous empirical evidence shows that state ownership has a quadratic function with ﬁrm performance
(Wei et al., 2005; Gunasekarage et al., 2007; Tian and Estrin, 2008). As such, the quadratic function is tested
in the regression models. This study is also interested in examining the eﬀect of the Split Share Structure
Reform on the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm performance. A reform dummy variable is cre-
ated: equal to one for years from 2006 onwards, and 0 otherwise. An interaction term between state ownership
and the reform dummy is then created to capture the eﬀect of the reform. The research includes panel data
regressions with state ownership, the reform dummy, the interaction term and other board and ﬁrm charac-
teristics as independent variables, and ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q as dependent variables.
5. Data analysis
The data set is taken from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database1 and
covers all Chinese public listed companies from 2003 to 2010, excluding companies in the ﬁnance industry
and those that only issued B-shares. Chinese companies may issue three types of tradable shares. Tradable
A-shares are listed on the two domestic stock exchanges (Shanghai and Shenzhen) to domestic investors
and denominated in Chinese renminbi (RMB). B-shares are issued to foreign investors and traded in either
US or Hong Kong dollars. Further, a Chinese company may also trade on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
and issue H-shares. This study deals with Chinese PLCs that issue A-shares in domestic stock exchanges (Con-
yon and He, 2011). The data of companies that received special treatment or had incomplete data or extreme
values were excluded. The ﬁnal sample size is 10,639 ﬁrm-year observations. To remove the eﬀect of outliers,
we winsorize the ﬁrm performance variables.2 Winsorization is commonly used in corporate governance liter-
ature, such as studies by Erkens et al. (2012) and Liu et al. (2012).
5.1. Descriptive data
After the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee’s adoption of reform and opening-up policies
in 1978, China started its market-driven economic reforms. The ﬁrst stock market was set up in Shanghai in
1990, and in 1991, a second stock market was set up in Shenzhen. Panel A of Table 2 shows the data from 1991
to 2001 as a summary of the statistics from a study by Wei et al. (2005). We can clearly see the development of
the Chinese PLCs and the state ownership percentages since 1991. The number of Chinese PLCs included in
the study by Wei et al. (2005) begins at nine in 1991, rises to 25 in 1992, and quickly develops into over 1000 in
2001. Average state ownership from 1991 to 2001 varies from 20.6 to 33.4%.
Panel B shows that state ownership has been declining, particularly since the 2006 Split Share Structure
Reform. Average ROA and ROE reveal that ﬁrm performance dipped in 2008 due to the ﬁnancial crisis
and began to recover in 2009. Panel C shows that with the exception of the ﬁnance industry, there are 12
industries according to guidance on the CSRC’s Industry Classiﬁcation of Listed Companies (2001 version),
and 58.43% of observations are in the manufacturing sector. After the Split Share Structure Reform, the aver-
age state ownership from 2006 to 2010 became much lower compared with that during 2003–2005, except for
the publishing, broadcasting, and media industry sector. State ownership decreased signiﬁcantly after 2006,
but remains high in strategically important sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and the pub-
lishing, broadcasting and media industry sector. Wei and Varela (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrm size and strategic indus-
try status are the main determinants of state ownership. Ng et al. (2009) study newly listed companies from
1996 to 2003 and ﬁnd that strategically important industries such as mining and exploitation have positive
relationships with state ownership. In their study, mining and exploitation is the same industry as the oil,1 The CSMAR database is designed by the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
and developed by Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Corporation Limited.
2 We winsorize ROA and ROE at the 2.5% level in both tails of the distribution, and Tobin’s Q at the 2.5% level only at the right tail of
the distribution.
Table 2
Descriptive data.
Year No. of observations State ownership Year No. of observations State ownership ROA ROE Tobin’s Q
Panel A: Summary statistics of non-ﬁnancial
Chinese PLCs from Wei et al. (2005)
Panel B: Descriptive statistics by year
1991 9 0.278
1992 25 0.206
1993 93 0.284
1994 259 0.321 2003 1076 0.375 0.053 0.056 1.241
1995 285 0.309 2004 1180 0.358 0.056 0.059 1.127
1996 377 0.313 2005 1189 0.344 0.047 0.043 1.039
1997 663 0.313 2006 1232 0.296 0.060 0.07 1.261
1998 767 0.293 2007 1348 0.259 0.080 0.103 2.133
1999 861 0.281 2008 1429 0.223 0.063 0.073 1.291
2000 880 0.316 2009 1325 0.128 0.070 0.092 2.135
2001 1065 0.334 2010 1860 0.091 0.077 0.101 2.151
Industry Sample size Percent Average state ownership 2003–
2005
Average state ownership 2006–
2010
Panel C: Sample size and state ownership according to industry classiﬁcation
Agriculture, forestry, grazing, and
ﬁshing
232 2.18 0.373 0.155
Oil, natural gas, and mining 225 2.11 0.565 0.407
Manufacturing 6216 58.43 0.363 0.176
Electricity, gas, and water supply 437 4.11 0.474 0.312
Civil engineering and construction 230 2.16 0.467 0.239
Transportation and storage 468 4.4 0.467 0.331
Information technology 671 6.31 0.262 0.118
Wholesale and retail 650 6.11 0.365 0.178
Real estate 541 5.09 0.296 0.168
Public service 334 3.14 0.399 0.255
Publishing, broadcasting, and media 69 0.65 0.324 0.341
Conglomerates 566 5.32 0.193 0.101
10,639 100
Variable Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Panel D: Summary statistics
State ownership 0.245 0.187 0.251 0 0.971
ROA 0.065 0.059 0.058 0.090 0.212
ROE 0.077 0.077 0.110 0.296 0.321
Tobin’s Q 1.598 1.287 0.834 0.477 4.570
Board ownership 0.038 0.00001 0.122 0 0.748
Log of board salary 14.332 14.346 0.937 0 22.385
Log of assets 21.494 21.36 1.143 17.497 28.138
Debt ratio 0.478 0.492 0.195 0.008 0.999
Notes: ROA: (total proﬁts + ﬁnancial expenses)/average total assets. ROE: net proﬁts/average shareholders’ equity. Tobin’s Q: ratio of
market value to ending total assets, where the market value is the sum of the market value of equity and the market value of net debt. State
ownership: state shareholding percentage. Board ownership: board share ownership percentage. Log of board salary: log of the total
emolument of the top three directors. Log of assets: log of ﬁrm assets. Debt ratio: total liabilities/total assets.
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tive relationship with state ownership, although its sample size is small in the study by Ng et al. (2009). The
result from this study shows that the strategic importance of sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining
sector and the publishing, broadcasting and media sector remains a signiﬁcant factor in determining state
ownership. Panel D presents the summary statistics of the variables. Average state ownership is 24.5%
and it decreased from 37.5% in 2003 to 9.1% in 2010 as shown in Panel B. Average ROA, ROE and
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
ROA ROE Tobin’s
Q
State
ownership
Board
ownership
Log of board
salary
Log of
assets
Debt
ratio
ROA 1
ROE 0.882 1
Tobin’s Q 0.242 0.169 1
State ownership 0.041 0.04 0.318 1
Board ownership 0.189 0.127 0.094 0.282 1
Log of board
salary
0.291 0.307 0.100 0.113 0.067 1
Log of assets 0.140 0.210 0.242 0.161 0.179 0.460 1
Debt ratio 0.327 0.151 0.239 0.05 0.263 0.015 0.308 1
Notes: ROA: (total proﬁts + ﬁnancial expenses)/average total assets. ROE: net proﬁts/average shareholders’ equity. Tobin’s Q: ratio of
market value to ending total assets, where the market value is the sum of the market value of equity and the market value of net debt. State
ownership: state shareholding percentage. Board ownership: board share ownership percentage. Log of board salary: log of the total salary
of the top three directors. Log of assets: log of ﬁrm assets. Debt ratio: total liabilities/total assets.
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ratio is 47.8%.
The term “multicollinearity” refers to situations where two or more variables can be linearly related. Mul-
ticollinearity can result in numerically unstable estimates of the regression coeﬃcients. Table 3 reveals that the
correlations of each pairwise variable are low, except for ROA and ROE.
5.2. Regression analysis
We use a Hausman test to identify whether the ﬁxed eﬀects model is better than the random eﬀects model.
In this case, it is, and so the ﬁxed eﬀects results are reported. When presenting the results, Models 1, 3, and 5
include the quadratic terms of state ownership. In Models 2, 4 and 6, the state ownership reform variable is
added to test the eﬀect of the reform (see Table 4).
Model 1 reveals a U-shaped relationship between state ownership and ROA. The reﬂection point based on
Model 1 is 32%. State ownership is initially negatively related to ROA, but after this point, more state own-
ership begins to have positive implications for ROA. The reform dummy and state ownership/reform dummy
interaction term are added in Model 2, and both are positively related to ROA. This implies that the Split
Share Structure Reform has a positive eﬀect on ROA and on the relationship between state ownership and
ROA. In Model 3, a U-shaped relationship between state ownership and ROE is revealed. The reﬂection point
based on Model 3 is 31.44%. As such, Models 1 and 3 provide consistent evidence that for Chinese PLCs, state
ownership is initially negatively related to ﬁrm performance, and when state ownership is above a certain level
(about 32%), it begins to have positive implications for ﬁrm performance.
In the Chinese context, investor protection is poor, and the legal system and regulatory enforcement are
quite weak. Chinese public listed companies that have lower state shareholding levels may have large control-
ling shareholder or mixed/dispersed ownership structures. Dispersed ownership creates a free-rider problem,
as small investors do not have the incentives or resources to control and monitor management. Ng et al. (2009)
ﬁnd that Chinese ﬁrms with mixed control perform signiﬁcantly poorer than state or privately controlled ﬁrms
due to issues such as ownership and agent incentive/control ambiguity. Chinese PLCs typically have a large
controlling shareholder who has the ability to supervise and the power to tunnel wealth from small outside
investors (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). The goal of maximizing private beneﬁts becomes easier to realize
as the power of the dominant owners in the listed companies rises (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al.,
1999). Hence, lower levels of state ownership have negative implications for ﬁrm performance. When the state
ownership level is high, bureaucrats put more eﬀort into ﬁrms in which they have large holdings. SOEs may3 The mean and maximum values of the three ﬁrm performance variables may be lower than those presented in similar studies because
they are winsorized.
Table 4
Panel data regressions of ﬁrm performance: 2003–2010.
Dependent variables ROA ROA ROE ROE Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q
Independent variables FE coef. FE coef. FE coef. FE coef. FE coef. FE coef.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
State ownership 0.066*** 0.077*** 0.122*** 0.158*** 0.857*** 0.246
State ownership2 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.194*** 0.23*** 0.938*** 0.339
Reform 0.005** 0.003 0.267***
State ownership  Reform 0.009** 0.027*** 0.454***
Board ownership 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.142*** 0.137*** 1.7*** 1.61***
Log of board salary 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.056*** 0.057***
Log of assets 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.493*** 0.48***
Debt ratio 0.135*** 0.135*** 0.221*** 0.222*** 0.408*** 0.398***
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.213*** 0.205*** 0.726*** 0.702*** 11.2*** 10.8***
R2 0.142 0.142 0.104 0.105 0.559 0.562
N 10,639 10,639 10,639 10,639 10,639 10,639
Notes: ROA: (total proﬁts + ﬁnancial expenses)/average total assets. ROE: net proﬁts/average shareholders’ equity. Tobin’s Q: ratio of
market value to ending total assets, where market value is the sum of the market value of equity and the market value of net debt. State
ownership: state shareholding percentage. State ownership2: square term of state shareholding percentage. Reform: equals 1 for years
from 2006 onwards, and 0 otherwise. State ownership  Reform: interaction term of state ownership with the reform dummy. Board
ownership: board share ownership percentage. Log of board salary: log of the total emolument of the top three directors. Log of assets: log
of ﬁrm assets. Debt ratio: total liabilities/total assets.
 p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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and Estrin, 2008: Sun et al., 2002). The markets in China do not always operate openly and fairly, and this has
given politicians the ability to provide ﬁrms with privileged access to resources (Che and Qian, 1998). Firms
dominated by the various state players maintain a greater respect by the market and outperform those with
lower state blockholding levels (Hess et al., 2010). At high state shareholding levels, the state provides more
resources and greater authority compared with small investors under a dispersed ownership structure. Thus, a
higher level of state shareholding is superior to a dispersed ownership structure for Chinese PLCs, as it mit-
igates the free-rider problem of small investors. A high state ownership level has positive implications for ﬁrm
performance.
Wei and Varela (2003), Wei et al. (2005), Gunasekarage et al. (2007) and Tian and Estrin (2008) examine
Chinese listed ﬁrms from 1994–1996, 1991–2001, 2000–2004 and 1994–2000, respectively, and all ﬁnd a U-
shaped relationship between state ownership and market performance. Based on the most recent data from
2003 to 2010, the results of this paper are consistent with these four studies. The results reveal that the gov-
ernment acting as owner can improve corporate value in China, particularly if its shareholding is large enough.
As it results in preferential treatment from the government, state-based governance may be superior to a gov-
ernment vacuum under dispersed shareholding structures (Tian and Estrin, 2008).
In Model 4, the reform dummy is not signiﬁcant, and the state ownership reform variable again shows a
signiﬁcant positive sign. China’s unique split share structure and the existence of non-tradable shares intro-
duced more agency problems and rendered its capital market more conﬂicted than other emerging markets.
A reduction in government ownership may act to alleviate the multiple-principal problem (Jiang et al.,
2008) and improve corporate governance and stock market eﬃciency. Covering 2002–2008, Tseng (2012) ﬁnds
that the Split Share Structure Reform did play a positive role in alleviating the agency problems of listed ﬁrms
in China. Based on data from 2004 to 2008, Yu and Xu (2010) ﬁnd that the Split Share Structure Reform
improved ﬁrm performance. Liao et al. (2012) ﬁnd signiﬁcant improvements in listed SOEs’ outputs, proﬁt-
ability, employment, productive eﬃciency, and governance after the reform. The market mechanism that
helped to strike a balance between government agendas and public investor interests has played an important
and positive role in its success.
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state shareholders’ wealth has become more sensitive to share price movements, and their conﬂicts of interests
with private shareholders and information asymmetry have been reduced (Hou et al., 2012). Hou et al. (2012)
ﬁnd that share price informativeness has increased and that the reform has beneﬁted the information environ-
ment and minority shareholders in China’s stock market. The Split Share Structure Reform made non-trad-
able shares legally tradable, which has improved corporate governance, reduced the negative eﬀect of non-
tradable state shares and placed a greater focus on proﬁt maximization. Thus, it has played a positive role
in moderating the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm proﬁtability ratios.
Model 5 reveals a U-shaped relationship between state ownership and Tobin’s Q. In Model 6, the reform
dummy is positively related to Tobin’s Q and the state ownership reform variable is negatively related to
Tobin’s Q. The price of non-tradable state and legal person shares, based on book value, is lower than the
price of tradable shares. Compensation is normally made in the form of additional tradable shares distributed
to shareholders. As a result, the percentage of tradable shares increases and the percentage of non-tradable
shares reduces. The market’s reaction to the Split Share Structure Reform was positive, as shown in a study
by Beltratti et al. (2012), which further shows that the reform was beneﬁcial. The market rose 40% in the ﬁrst
4 months of 2007, immediately after the completion of the Split Share Structure Reform for the entire stock
market (Beltratti and Bortolotti, 2007). In late 2007 and during 2008, the A-share prices in the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges began to fall, due largely to the global credit crunch and in small part to the build-
ing of risk premiums related to fears of large-scale state share disposals (McGuinness, 2009). During the
reform, a series of measures were taken to limit the liquidity from expanding too fast and mitigate the huge
volatility in the stock market. All of the non-tradable shares could only be fully tradable over the 3 years fol-
lowing the ratiﬁcation of the compensation plan. The 3 years have since passed, and some Chinese PLCs have
reduced their state ownership to zero in 2009–2010. Since 2005, the percentage of state ownership has
decreased year by year, and the negative coeﬃcient of the state ownership reform variable indicates that
the reform had a negative eﬀect on the relationship between state ownership and market valuation due to var-
ious factors such as the excess liquidity caused by state share disposals and global credit crunch factors.
Across the four models, the control variables, log of board salary, and board ownership are positively
related to ﬁrm performance. As important incentive alignment mechanisms, board salary and ownership have
played a positive role in aligning board members’ objectives with those of the companies. Managers and direc-
tors whose personal wealth is signiﬁcantly linked to the value of their ﬁrms have an incentive to act in the
interests of outside shareholders. Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) and Henry (2008) ﬁnd a positive relation-
ship between company performance and board remuneration. Schmid and Zimmermann (2008) ﬁnd an
inverted U-shaped relationship between directors’ and oﬃcers’ shareholdings and ﬁrm value. He (2008) ﬁnds
a positive relationship between board ownership and ﬁrm performance. Firm size, as measured by the log of
ﬁrm assets, is positively related to the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability ratios. A ﬁrm’s assets or employee numbers have been
widely used in the literature to measure ﬁrm size, as in studies by Judge et al. (2003), Dahya and McConnell
(2007), Ehikioya (2009), Faleye (2007) and Elsayed (2007). Debt ratios are negatively related to ﬁrm perfor-
mance, consistent with numerous other studies (e.g., Hossain et al., 2001; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Li and
Wong, 2003; Panasian et al., 2008).
6. Conclusion and policy implication
This study applies panel data regression techniques to examine the relationship between state ownership
and ﬁrm performance for 10,639 ﬁrm-year observations of non-ﬁnancial Chinese public listed ﬁrms during
2003–2010. The results show that state ownership has a U-shaped relationship with ﬁrm performance. The
Split Share Structure Reform in 2005–2006 played a positive role in enhancing the relationship between state
ownership and ﬁrm proﬁtability ratios. Although state ownership decreased signiﬁcantly after 2006, it has
remained high in strategically important industry sectors such as the oil, natural gas and mining sector and
the publishing, broadcasting and media sector.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) identify concentrated ownership as an essential element of a good corporate
governance system. Unlike diversiﬁed investors who own an insigniﬁcant fraction of outstanding equity,
the large equity positions held by blockholders eﬀectively give them some control over the ﬁrms in which they
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role in enhancing ﬁrm performance. In the Chinese context, investor protection is poor and law enforcement is
quite weak. The state, being the large shareholder, can provide support in terms of ﬁnancing and resources. A
higher level of state shareholding is superior to a dispersed ownership structure, as the latter suﬀers from a
free-rider problem. At a higher state ownership level, state-based governance may be superior to a governance
vacuum under a dispersed shareholding structure (Tian and Estrin, 2008).
The Split Share Structure Reform abolished the trading restrictions on non-tradable shares. It has played a
positive role in alleviating the agency problems of listed companies in China (Tseng, 2012) and multiple-prin-
cipal problems through its reduction of state ownership (Jiang et al., 2008). As a result, it has improved cor-
porate governance and reduced the negative eﬀects of non-tradable state shares and played a positive role in
moderating the relationship between state ownership and ﬁrm proﬁtability ratios.
This paper’s results reveal that the state shareholder oﬀers both a “grabbing hand” and a “helping hand” to
Chinese PLCs. The Split Share Structure Reform has played a positive role in enhancing the relationship
between state ownership and ﬁrm proﬁtability ratios. The results from this paper provide practical guidelines
for optimal ownership structures to enhance Chinese PLCs’ ﬁnancial performance. The policy implication is
that along with the privatization of SOEs, strengthening institutions and sound reforms are also crucial for the
development of China’s stock market.
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